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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20151070-CA
NIKOLAOS ANTONIO,
Appellant is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Mr. Antonio was convicted of three counts of violation of a protective order, class
A misdemeanors in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-108. The Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment is attached as Addendum A. Utah Code§ 78A-4-103 (2)(e) provides
jurisdiction.

ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether the court erred by denying Mr. Antonio's renewed motion for a
directed verdict where the State' s evidence failed to show that he intentionally or
knowingly violated the protective order.
Standard of Review: This Comi reviews a challenge to the trial court's ruling on a
motion for a directed verdict "for correctness, giving no paiiicular deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, il15, 167 P.3d 503
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It will "uphold the trial court's

decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
from it, [it] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could

•

find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved. R.318-21 (Mr. Antonio's motion for a
directed verdict and trial court's ruling); 369-70 (Mr. Antonio's renewed motion for a
directed verdict and trial court's ruling).

STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to the issue on appeal: Utah Code§ 76-5-108.
Its text is provided in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 16, 2014, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Antonio with
one count of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code§ 76-5-108. R.1-3. The Information was subsequently amended to include two
additional counts of violation of a protective order, class A misdemeanors. R.44-45, 5354. Mr. Antonio was bound over on all counts. R.44-45.
A one-day jury trial was held on August 26, 2015. R.158. At the close of the
State' s case, Mr. Antonio made a motion for a directed verdict on all three counts. R.160,
3 18-1 9. The court denied that motion. R. 160, 320-21. Before the case was submitted to
the jury, Antonio renewed his motion for a directed verdict, which was also denied.
R.160-61, 369-70. He was found guilty on all three counts. R.133, 404.
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Mr. Antonio was sentenced to 365 days injail on Counts 1, 2, and 3. R.181 -82.
For Count 1, the court suspended his jail term by 305 days, and for Counts 2 and 3, it
suspended bothjail terms by 365 days. R.181-82. Mr. Antonio timely appealed. R.18990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's Allegations.
Nikolaos Antonio and Leslie Kerbs shared a four-year relationship and had a child
together. R.287-88. After their relationship ended, Ms. Kerbs received a temporary
protective order against Mr. Antonio, which was granted on May 21, 2014. R.288-89. A
pe1manent protective order was subsequently entered on June 18, 2015 and served on Mr.
Antonio on June 19, 2014. R.289-90, 309-10; State's Ex. 1. The protective order
prohibited Mr. Antonio from contacting Ms. Kerbs and ordered that supervised visits
with the child be arranged through Kerbs's mother or father. R.290-92; State's Ex. 1.
Ms. Kerbs alleged that Mr. Antonio called her three times on July 8, 2014. R.297303, 305. Ms. Kerbs recorded the first call, which is provided as follows:
Ms. Kerbs: Hello.
Mr. Antonio: Who's this?
Ms. Kerbs: This is Leslie .. .. ·who's this?
Mr. Antonio: Oh, hi.
Ms. Kerbs: Who's this?
Mr. Antonio: Sorry.
Ms. Kerbs: For what?
Mr. Antonio: I didn't mean to call you I guess.
Ms. Kerbs: What do you mean, you guess?
Mr. Antonio: I didn't mean to call you ... . When can I see [our
daughter]?
3

Ms. Kerbs: You know you have to talk to my 1110111 about that. You're not
supposed to be calling me.
Mr. Antonio: [inaudible] one of the days I can go to her house.
Ms. Kerbs: You have to call my 1110111 for that, okay?
Mr. Antonio: Are you really doing all this, Leslie?
Ms. Kerbs: Do not call me again.

R.295, 297, 305-06; State's Ex. 2.
Ms. Kerbs testified that Mr. Antonio called from an unknown telephone number
ending in 1330 ("the ' 1330' number") rather than Antonio's personal number that was
stored in her cell phone and associated with Antonio's first name, "Nik" ("the 'Nik'
number"). R.297-302, 366-68; State' s Exs. 3-4. However, she previously told the police
that Mr. Antonio called from the "Nik" number, not the "1330" number. R.314.
After the call ended, Ms. Kerbs called police dispatch because she was concerned
Mr. Antonio was violating the protective order. R.300, 303. She testified that while she
was on the phone with the police, Mr. Antonio called a second time, but she did not
answer the call. R.300. Kerbs claimed that she took a screenshot of the call log on her
cellphone, which showed a missed call from the "Nik" number. R.300; State's Ex. 3.
According to Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called a third time from the "1330" number
he first called from. R.301-03, 367-68; State's Ex. 4. She testified that Mr. Antonio "just
said 'hey' multiple times trying to get [her] attention," and then she hung up the phone.
R.303. Ms. Kerbs said she took another screenshot of this call. R.302. She gave the
recorded conversation and both screenshots to the police. R.295-302.
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Officer ·w atson, who spoke with Ms. Kerbs about Mr. Antonio's alleged
protective order violation, also had a conversation with Mr. Antonio that day. R.312-13.
Officer Watson testified that Mr. Antonio denied calling or making any contact with Ms.
Kerbs. R.313. According to Watson, Mr. Antonio indicated he was aware that a
protective order was in place and understood that he was prohibited from contacting Ms.
Kerbs. R.313. The conversation between Officer Watson and Mr. Antonio was not
recorded. R.314-15.
After the State rested, Mr. Antonio moved for a directed verdict on all three
counts. R.318-19. Specifically, Mr. Antonio argued that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence with regard to the "intent element" of violation of a protective order
counts. R.318-19. The court denied Mr. Antonio's directed verdict motion, reasoning
"that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on all three counts." R.320-21.
Mr. Antonio did not Believe that an Active Protective Order was in Place.
Mr. Antonio presented evidence showing that he did not knowingly or

intentionally violate the protective order; rather, he believed that the protective order was,
in effect, stayed by a motion to set aside judgment he filed on the same day the protective
order was entered.
After a protective order hearing on June 18, 2014, a permanent protective ordered
was entered in favor of Ms. Kerbs. Mr. Antonio-a pro se litigant-was at the courthouse
that day, but did not attend the protective order hearing due to some confusion. R.332-34,
347. Shortly after the hearing concluded, Mr. Anontio spoke to the judge's clerk, who
advised him to fill out a motion to set aside default judgment with regards to the
5
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protective order. R.335. Mr. Antonio then went to the self-help center at the comthouse
and completed and filed a motion to set aside judgment. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4.
Based on conversations with comt personnel, Mr. Antonio believed that his
motion to set aside judgement operated to "strike the protective order" and set aside the
judgment until he had a new hearing. He testified that he left the courthouse thinking
there was no active protective order in place at that time. R.337-38, 340.
Mr. Antonio explained that when he called Ms. Kerbs on July 8, 2014, he did not
initially know that he was calling her. R.341-42. According to Mr. Antonio, he returned a
missed call from a number in his phone, however, he did not realize it was Kerbs's
number because he had previously deleted Kerbs's contact information. R.342. Mr.
Antonio explained that he did not initially call Kerbs on purpose, but also did not believe
that bis conversation with her amounted to a protective order violation because he was
under the impression that the protective order "was not active until [they] had a hearing."
R.342-43 . Mr. Antonio testified to only one telephone call to Kerbs on July 8, 2014. See
R.332-64
After speaking with Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called Officer Watson regarding an
unrelated matter. R.344-45. Mr. Antonio then called the court to verify the status of the
protective order and motion to set aside judgment. R345-46; Def. Ex. 3. He explained
that prior to his conversation with Officer Watson, he was under the impression that there
was no protective order in effect. R.346.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Mr. Antonio renewed his motion for a
directed verdict. He argued that the evidence was not sufficient to show that he
6

"knowingly and intentionally violated the protective order on any of the three occasions."
R.369-70. The court denied this motion. R.370.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Mr. Antonio argues that the trial comi e1Ted when it denied his directed verdict
motions because the State's evidence was insufficient to satisfy the elements of violation
of a protective order. Specifically, he contends that the State did not produce sufficient
evidence to show that he knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order.
Therefore, Mr. Antonio requests that this Comi reverse his convictions on all counts.
ARGUMENT
I.

TIDS COURT SHOULD REVERSE ON ALL COUNTS BECAUSE THE
STATE DID NOT PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SATISFY THE
ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER.

Mr. Antonio contends that the trial court eITed when it denied his renewed motion
for a directed verdict because the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support
the charged crimes. Accordingly, he asks this Court to reverse his convictions for
violation of a protective order on all counts.
This Court will "'reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when"' it concludes
'" as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction."' State v.
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ifl 0, 2 P.3d 954. It will '"view the evidence in a light most

favorable to the jury verdict,"' and reverse '" if the evidence is so "inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime.""' Id.; Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ifl 5 n.7
(when "determin[ing] whether some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could
7

find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, [the]
court necessarily needs to determine if the evidence [presented] is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Although the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high, it is not
impossible." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, i)l 0. This Corni "'will not make speculative
leaps across gaps in the evidence."' Id. '" Every element of the crime charged must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. And even though "the court must ordinarily
accept the jury's determination of witness credibility, when the witness's testimony is
inherently improbable, the court may choose to disregard it." State v. Robbins, 2009 UT
23, i)16, 210 P.3d 288. In fact, "[i]n a criminal case ... the trial court may afford less
deference to inherently improbable, inconsistent, uncorroborated witness testimony." Id.
Indeed, " [a] conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand." Id. i)14
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Antonio contends that the State's evidence was so inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed violation
of a protective order on all three counts. To sustain a conviction for violation of a
protective order, the State must provide evidentiary proof that "(1) the defendant was
subject to a protective order; (2) the defendant was properly served with the protective
order; and (3) the defendant intentionally or knowingly violated the order." State v.
Peterson, 2008 UT App 137, at *1 (emphasis added) (alterations and quotation marks
8

omitted); Utah Code § 76-5-108 (providing that a person is guilty of violation of a
protective order if the defendant is "subject to a protective order" and "intentionally or
knowingly violates that order after having been properly served"). 1
In this case, Mr. Antonio maintains that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to
show that he committed violation of a protective order. See infra Part I.A. Specifically, he
argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly or
intentionally violated the protective order. See infra Part LB.

A. The Marshalled Evidence is Insufficient.
When raising an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant '"must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,
il14, 989 P.2d 1065. The marshaling requirement is "a natural extension of an appellant's
burden of persuasion," not a ground for procedural default. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,
il41, 326 P.3d 645.
The State provided the following evidence to suppo1i its claim that Mr. Antonio
committed three counts of violation of a protective order:
1. Ms. Kerbs received a temporary protective order against Mr. Antonio, which was
granted on May 21 , 2014 and extended to June 18, 2014. R.288-89, 348-50. Mr.
1

Under Utah law, a person acts "intentionally" "when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code§ 76-2-103. A person
acts "knowingly" "with respect to his conduct or to circumstances smrounding his
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances." Id.
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Antonio had notice of the temporary protective order. R.348 -50; see also State's
Exs. 5-6.
2. A pennanent protective order was entered on June 18, 2015.R.289-90; State's Ex.
1. The protective order prohibited Mr. Antonio from contacting Ms. Kerbs. R.29092; State's Ex. 1. The protective order also stated as follows: "This is a court
order. No one except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you
can be arrested, fined, and face other charges. This order is valid in all U.S. states
and teITitories." R.352-53; State's Ex. 1.
3. Mr. Antonio did not attend the permanent protective order hearing held on June
18, 2015. R.332-34, 352. After the hearing that day, he filed a motion to set aside
judgment. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4. Based on conversations with comi personnel,
Mr. Antonio believed that his motion to set aside judgement operated to "strike the
protective order" and set aside the judgment until he had a new hearing. R.33 7-38.
Antonio never talked to the judge about his motion to set aside judgement. R.355,
358.

4. Mr. Antonio was served with the protective order on June 19, 2014. R.289-90,
309-10; State's Ex. 1. On June 24, 2014, Mr. Antonio called the court to inquire
about a matter related to service of his motion to set aside judgement. R.362; Def.
Ex. 3.
5. On July 8, 2014, Ms. Kerbs alleged that Mr. Antonio called her three times.
R.297-303, 305. She claimed that she never called or texted Mr. Antonio since the
protective order was entered. R.365. Ms. Kerbs testified that the first call came
from an unknown telephone number ending in 1330, but she recognized Mr.
Antonio's voice on the other end. R.293, 295, 305-06. A recording of the call was
admitted into evidence as State's Ex. 2, and is transcribed, supra, at pages 3-4.
6. After the first call ended, Ms. Kerbs said she called police dispatch because she
was concerned Mr. Antonio was violating the protective order. R.300, 303. She
testified that while she was on the phone with the police, Mr. Antonio called a
second time, but she did not answer the call. R.300. Ms. Kerbs provided a
screenshot of that call to the police, which was admitted as State's Ex. 3. That
exhibit shows a call from a number associated with the name "Nik" as well as a
picture of Mr. Antonio. State's Ex. 3.
7. According to Ms. Kerbs, Mr. Antonio called a third time from the " 1330" number
he first called from. R.301-03, 367-68; State's Ex. 4. She testified that Mr.
Antonio "just said 'hey' multiple times trying to get [her] attention," and then she
bung up the phone. R.303. Ms. Kerbs said she took another screenshot of this call,
which was introduced as State's Ex. 4. R.302 .
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8. Officer Watson testified that Mr. Antonio denied calling or making any contact
with Ms. Kerbs. R.313. According to Watson, Mr. Antonio indicated he was aware
that a protective order was in place and understood that he was prohibited from
contacting Ms. Kerbs. R.313. Mr. Antonio did not tell Watson that he believed the
protective order was inactive. R.363-64.
9. On July 8, 2014, Mr. Antonio called the court "to find out the status of the motion
to set aside he filed" and he was told that the judge had not yet made a decision.
Defense Ex. 3.
10. Mr. Antonio agreed that a permanent protective order was in place "[t]hat morning
of the 18 th where [he]' d missed the hearing." R.3 5 9.
Mr. Antonio maintains that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions because it is too inconclusive to show that he knowingly or intentionally
violated the protective order.
B. Reasonable Minds Must Have Entertained a Reasonable Doubt that Mr.
Antonio Knowingly or Intentionally Violated the Protective Order.

Mr. Antonio maintains that his convictions for violation of a protective order were
not based on substantial reliable evidence because the State fai led to show that he acted
knowingly or intentionally. Rather, he argues that the evidence demonstrates that he did
not act knowingly or intentionally as he mistakenly believed that the protective order was
effectually stayed by his motion to set aside judgment.
After the June 18, 2014 protective order hearing, which Mr. Antonio did not attend
due to some confusion, the judge's clerk advised him to fill out a motion to set aside
default judgment with regards to the protective order. R.332-35, 347. Mr. Antonio then
filed a motion to set aside judgment shortly after the protective order was entered that
day. R.336-339; Def. Ex. 4. Based on conversations with comi personnel, Mr. Antonio
believed that this motion operated to "strike the protective order" and set aside the
11

judgment until he had a new hearing. R.337-38. And while Mr. Antonio acknowledged
that a permanent protective order existed, see R.359, he believed it was only in place for
the short period of time prior to the filing of his motion. R.359-60. Hence, when Mr.
Antonio left the comihouse on June 18, 2014 and subsequently called Ms. Kerbs on July
8, 2014, he was under the impression that there was no protective order in place. R.340.
Mr. Antonio's testimony was further supported by an exhibit of the motion itself

as well as a certified docket from the court that issued the protective order. See Def. Exs.
3-4. Indeed, the July 8, 2014 docket entry-which indicates that Antonio called the comi
"to find out the status of the motion to set aside"-supports Mr. Antonio's testimony that
he sought to verify the status of the protective order and motion to set aside judgment
after he learned that police records revealed the existence of an active protective order.
See R.345-46; Def. Ex. 3.

Evidence that Mr. Antonio was served with the protective order on June 19, 2014
and evidence of the protective order' s warnings fail to suppo1i the State's claim that
Antonio acted knowingly or intentionally. Mr. Antonio explained that he received a copy
of the protective order on June 18th and thought the June 19th service was "[j]ust a
redundant duplicate service" of the protective order he believed had been rendered
inoperative by his motion to set aside. R.340-42, 360-61. Accordingly, he did not find the
June 19th service significant and remained under the impression that the protective order
was not active. R341, 360-61. Similarly, when Mr. Antonio called the comi on June 24,
2014 to inquire about a matter related to service of his motion, his understanding was that
the protective order "had been set aside until the new hearing date." R.362; Def. Ex. 3.
12

Mr. Antonio's confusion about the effect of the motion to set aside judgment was
believable because he was not represented by an attorney. R.347.
Furthermore, there is little about the calls themselves that tended to show Mr.
Antonio knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order. With regard to the first
call (Count 1), Mr. Antonio explained be returned a missed call, but he did not realize the
number belonged to Ms. Kerbs because he had deleted her contact information to avoid
"any butt dial incidents." R.342. His testimony was supp01ted by the recording of the call
in which he initiates the conversation by asking, " [w]ho's this" and states, "I didn't mean
to call you." See State's Ex. 2. Not only does the evidence demonstrate that Mr.
Antonio's call to Kerbs was initially inadve1tent, but it also shows that Antonio thought
he could lawfully speak with her because he believed the protective order "was not
active." R.342-43.
Similarly, the evidence is insufficient to show that Mr. Antonio acted knowingly
or intentionally with respect to the second and third calls alleged (Counts 2 and 3). Mr.
Antonio testified to only one telephone call to Kerbs. See R.332-64. And as discussed, he
was under the impression that the protective order was inactive on the day on which the
alleged second and third calls were made. R.342-43 , 346. Furthern1ore, while Ms. Kerbs
attributed the second call to the "Nik" number, Ms. Kerbs never answered that call.
R.300. Thus, there is little to suggest that the call was anything more than an inadvertent
"butt dial." See R.342.
Likewise, Mr. Antonio contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
even made the third call, let alone acted knowingly or intentionally in doing so. Ms.
13

Kerbs testified to the following order of calls: Mr. Antonio called from the "1330"
number; Kerbs then called police dispatch, which she attributed to a number ending in
" 7000" 2 ; Kerbs received a missed call from the "Nik" number while she was talking to
the police; and finally, Antonio called from the "1330" number " [s]hortly after [she] hung
up with the phone with the police." R.297-303, 366-68; State's Ex. 3-4. However, the
portion of Ms. Kerbs's call log that purports to show the third call from the "1330"
number is inconsistent with Kerbs's testimony regarding the call order. See State's Ex. 4
(call log indicating an incoming call from the "1330" number, an outgoing call to police
dispatch, and then another incoming call from the " 1330" number); see also R.297-302,
314, 365, 367 (Kerbs providing inconsistent statements regarding the call order and the
telephone numbers called from). Mr. Antonio argues that Ms. Kerbs's inconsistent
testimony regarding the order of the calls would cause reasonable minds to doubt that he
knowingly or intentionally called Kerbs a third time from the "1330" number. See

Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ,r,rB-1 8.
Finally, Officer Watson's testimony regarding Mr. Antonio's acknowledgement of
the protective order adds little to the State's case. The State did not produce a recording
of Watson and Antonio's conversation, R.314-16, and Mr. Antonio explained that he
"didn't have a chance" to tell Watson that he believed the protective order was inactive.
R.363-64. Moreover, Mr. Antonio clarified that he only acknowledged in the "past tense"
that a valid protective order had once existed; Mr. Antonio explained that Watson "didn't
2

Looking at the call log (State's Ex. 3), Ms. Kerbs testified that the telephone
number directly above the number highlighted in red was "the police"-or, as shown in
the call log, the number ending in "7000." R.300-01 ; State's Ex. 3.
14
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put across the question to [him] like: Do you know there is [an active protective order]
right now?" R.345. Thus, as Mr. Antonio explained, Officer Watson was mistaken in his
testimony regarding the extent of Antonio's acknowledgment that a valid protective order
existed on July 8, 2014. R.358.

In light of the State' s inconclusive evidence, Mr. Antonio contends that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally
violated the protective order. Accordingly, he argues, the State' s evidence is insufficient
to sustain bis convictions for violation of a protective order on all three counts.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Antonio respectfully requests that this court
reverse bis convictions and order an acquittal on all counts.

SUBMITTED thi~ay of June, 20 16.

~L~~
XANDRAS.MALLUM
tomeyforDefendant/Appellant
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The Orde r of th e Cour t is staled below:
Dated: December 10, 20 15
At th!! d,ii:_cc'tl?i•ti.qf:.
02 :4 I : IO PM
Charle_ef~ ~:ll'f~✓-r
Dislric_t G_Pvg/~~e·J

\

\ S(t~:. ~.~-/~·

L>y

Isl Mindec CJatJ.tJ~~~.·•'
District Court Clerk

3RD DIST . COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH ,

MINUTES

Plaintiff ,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMM I TMENT

vs .

Case No : 141 4 01850 MO

NIKOLAOS ANTONIO ,
Defend ant .

Judge :

CHARLENE BARLOW

Date :

December 10, 2015

PRESENT
Clerk :

mindeec

Prosecu tor : STANGER , CRJ>.IG N
Defendant
Defendant 's Attorney( s) : SEAMAN , CHRISTINE M
DEFEND~.NT INFORMATION
Date of birth : May 22 , 1985
Sheriff Off i ce# : 380226
Audio
Tape Number :

37

Tape Count: 925

This case i nvolves domestic violence.
CHARGES
1 . VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeano r
- Di spos it ion : 08/26/2015 Guilty
2 . VIOLATION OF PROTECT I VE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor
- Dis posi t ion : 08/26/2015 Guilty
3 . VI OLATION OF PROTECTI VE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor
- Dispos i tion : 08/26/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant ' s conviction of VIOL.~TION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A
Misdemea nor , the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)

The tota l time

suspended for this charge is 305 day(s) .
Based on the defend ant ' s conv iction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A
Misdemeanor , the defendant is s e ntenced to a term of 3 65 day(s)

The total time

suspended for this charge is 365 day{s) .
Based on the defendant ' s conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER a Class A
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Case No: 141401850 Date:

Dec 10, 2015

Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)

The t otal time

suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Commitment is to begin immediately.

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Upon serving jail time the court orders case closed .
SENTENCE FINE
Charge ll 1

Fine: $2500 . 00
Suspended : $2500.00
Surcharge : $

Charge Ii 2

Fine: $2500.00
Suspended: $2500.00
Surcharge : $

Charge

""

3

Fine : $2500.00
Suspended : $2500 . 00
Surcharge :

s

Total Fine : $7500 . 00
Total Suspended: $7500 . 00
Total Surcharge : $0
Total Principal Due:

so
Plus Interest

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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Tab B

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-108
§ 76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another--Violation

(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order, child protective
order, ex parte protective order, or ex parte child protective order issued under Title 78B, Chapter
7, Pmi 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act; Title 78A, Chapter 6, Juvenile Comi Act; Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act; or a foreign protection order enforceable under Title 78B,
Chapter 7, Part 3, Unifonn Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act,
who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.

(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence offense under
Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.

Credits
Laws 1979, c. 111 , § 10; Laws 1984, c. 12, § l; Laws 1991 , c. 75, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 137, § 12;
Laws 1995, c. 300, § 15, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 244, § 9, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1999,
c. 246, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 68, § 7, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 157, § 15, eff.
July 1, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 233, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 196, § 3, eff. May 14, 2013.

